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In September 1957, Governor Orval Faubus dispatched Arkansas National
Guard troops to prevent black students from entering Central High School in
Little Rock, Arkansas. The Eisenhower Administration responded by sending
Justice Department lawyers to enter school desegregation litigation brought
by the NAACP that was already pending before the U.S. District Court in
Arkansas. The court granted the preliminary injunction sought by the Justice
Department and the NAACP, holding that federal law preempted state
interference with school integration.  A few weeks later, in the face of local1
resistance edged with hatred and violence, President Eisenhower ordered the
famous 101st Airborne to Arkansas to maintain order and safeguard the black
school children. The court’s injunction was upheld on appeal, and Central
High was eventually desegregated.  The most important legacy of the conflict,2
however, may have been the images from the streets of Little Rock—striking
† Edgar M. Snyder Lecture, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
* Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law School. I am grateful to Professor David Harris and Dean
Mary Crossley for the opportunity to serve as the 2010 Edgar M. Snyder Distinguished Visiting Scholar,
and for comments from Lucas Guttentag, Susan Hazeldean, Dan Kanstroom, Peter Markowitz, and Nancy
Morawetz. I am indebted to Stephen Poellot for superb research assistance. The introductory portion of
these remarks first appeared as The Summer of ’10: Federal Power, Local Autonomy, and the Struggle over
Immigration Policy, 4 ORIGINS 2 (Nov. 2010), http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/origins/article.cfm?articleid=48.
1. Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Ark. 1957).
2. Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1958).
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photographs of tense black students, sturdy federal troops, and a surging,
spitting crowd of white protesters.3
It is too early to know whether the events of the summer of ’10 will mark
a similar watershed in the struggle for immigrant rights, or the Justice
Department’s role in that struggle. But it is noteworthy that in July of
2010—echoes of the summer of ’57—Justice Department lawyers went to
U.S. District Court to enjoin Arizona Senate Bill 1070, Arizona’s most recent
nativist statute, after the American Civil Liberties Union, NAACP, and others
had already commenced litigation. The District Court granted the Justice
Department’s request for a preliminary injunction.4
In a further echo of the heartbreaking courage displayed by the young
adults who attempted to integrate Central High, the summer of ’10 also
witnessed widespread protests by undocumented high school and college
students, many of whom were brought to the United States as infants. Across
the country, young adults declared their unauthorized status to political leaders
and the media, risking deportation even while insisting on their moral claim
to full and equal membership in society.  Many of these protests were5
organized in support of proposed legislation, known as the DREAM Act,6
which would allow some students to regularize their status. No image from
these protests has yet achieved the iconic, conscience-provoking status of the
photographs from Little Rock, but the movement is still young.
Finally, as summer ended in early September, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit invalidated, on preemption grounds, an anti-immigrant
ordinance enacted in Hazleton, Pennsylvania, not 100 miles from where we
3. Will Counts, A Life is More than a Moment: The Desegregation of Little Rock’s Central High
(2007), available at http://www.encyclopediaofarkansas.net/media/gallery/photo/will_counts1_f.jpg.
4. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL
1346945 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2011). The District Court subsequently denied most parts of the State’s motion
to dismiss the suit filed by civil rights organizations as well. Friendly House v. Whiting, No. CV 10-1061-
PHX-SRB (Oct. 8, 2010), available at http://acluaz.org/press_releases/Attachments/Bolton%20Order%
20on%20Mot%20to%20Dismiss.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Tara Bahrampour, Students Raise Stakes Against Immigration’s Status Quo, WASH.
POST, July 21, 2010 (describing sit-ins outside of the White House and Senate Office Building); see also
Maggie Jones, Coming Out Illegal, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 25, 2010; Maria Sacchetti, Students Here
Illegally Rally in Hope of Living American Dream, BOSTON GLOBE, May 26, 2010; David Montgomery,
Trail of Dreams Students Walk 1,500 Miles to Bring Message to Washington, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2010;
Rhonda Bodfield, Four Arrested at McCain Office Sit-in, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, May 18, 2010. The movement
has continued into the fall. See, e.g., Diana Marcum, Students Want the Dream Act to Become Reality, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2010.
6. Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2009, S. 729. 111th Cong. (2009);
American Dream Act, H.R. 1751, 111th Cong. (2009).
2011] THE STRUGGLE FOR BALANCE 433
are now, in a sweeping 188-page opinion authored by Chief Judge Ted
McKee.7
Like Orval Faubus before her, Governor Jan Brewer of Arizona appealed
the court order enjoining S.B. 1070. She has sounded “law-and-order” themes
(even while asserting, and then disavowing, the claim that illegal immigration
has left headless corpses scattered along the Arizona side of the border) and
insisted on the right of her state to conduct its own affairs.  The struggles8
today in Arizona, Hazleton, and elsewhere do not occur in a vacuum, of
course, but rather play out in the context of the nation’s historic immigration
law and policy. Nor is the specific dispute in Arizona—the proper role, if any,
for state and local actors in making or enforcing immigration law—new.
I hope to do three things. First, I will consider state variation and state-
federal conflict over immigration from a historical perspective. Second, I will
share my sense of the context and likely outcome of the current debates.
Finally, I want to talk about proportionality in immigration law and suggest
an important, but previously under-appreciated, role for the courts in
smoothing out the roughest edges of the current disputes.
I. EARLY ORIGINS
Two founding-era debates illustrate that disagreements about liberal and
restrictive immigration and naturalization policies and the optimal degree of
local autonomy in a system of national immigration rules date to the very
earliest days of the nation.
A. Acadian Refugees
One immigration event that likely shaped views of the founding
generation was the Acadian refugee crisis of the late 1750s. The Acadians
were French Catholic settlers in the Canadian Maritimes who became British
subjects under the Treaty of Utrecht.  However, the Acadians refused to swear9
7. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. filed.
8. Cf. Linda Feldmann, Obama, Arizona Gov. Brewer Face Off Over Illegal Immigration,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 3, 2010 (quoting Gov. Brewer: “I think it’s important to not only the state
of Arizona but to all of America that we are able to tell [President Obama] exactly what is taking place
down there in Arizona and that we need to have our borders secured,” and “The kidnap capital of the world
is Phoenix because of the drop-houses, the drug cartels. . . . We can’t tolerate it.”); Paul Davenport &
Amanda Lee Myers, Arizona Governor Admits She Was Wrong About Beheadings, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Sept. 4, 2010.
9. NAOMI E.S. GRIFFITHS, THE CONTEXTS OF ACADIAN HISTORY, 1686–1784, at 35 (1992).
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allegiance to Britain and as a result, their formal citizenship status was
ambiguous.  Many British authorities and American colonists considered the10
Acadians foreigners, “French” or, at best, “French neutrals.”11
Weary of Acadian resistance to English rule, in 1755, British troops
launched a brutal campaign to deport thousands of Acadians by driving them
off their lands, burning their former villages, and removing the Acadians to
the American colonies.  The response of the colonies to this early refugee12
crisis varied, however. Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, for instance, enacted
legislation authorizing the compulsory “binding out” of Acadian children as
indentured laborers.  One Acadian petition in Pennsylvania sought mercy,13
explaining that Acadians would be “the most unhappy People that ever
appeared, if, after having lost what God had given us, for the Subsistence of
our Families, we see ourselves forced to tear our Children from the Arms of
our tender Wives.”14
Elsewhere, colonial officials detained or jailed groups of Acadians and
considered mass expulsions. The British delivered many of the most
dangerous Acadians to South Carolina, where local authorities at first refused
to allow the refugees to set foot on land.  The Governor suggested resettling15
the Acadians on islands off the South Carolina coast, “where little Huts may
be put up for them”  and cattle and rice supplied until either further16
instructions from the Crown were given, “or some legal & effectual Method
be thought of to get clear of them.”  Eventually, the Governor agreed to send17
the most dangerous Acadians up the coast to North Carolina and Virginia, and
the Assembly passed legislation to indenture some of the remaining Acadians
and release others for resettlement.18
10. FRED ANDERSON, CRUCIBLE OF WAR: THE SEVEN YEARS’ WAR AND THE FATE OF THE EMPIRE
IN BRITISH NORTH AMERICA, 1754–1766, at 113 (2000); GRIFFITHS, supra note 9, at 113.
11. Id. at 36.
12. ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 113–14; STEPHEN PLANK, AN UNSETTLED CONQUEST: THE
BRITISH CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE PEOPLES OF ACADIA 149 (2001).
13. GRIFFITHS, supra note 9, at 95–127; PLANK, supra note 12, at 149–57.
14. Naomi E.S. Griffiths, Petitions of Acadian Exiles, 1755–1785: A Neglected Source, 11
HISTOIRE SOCIALE-SOCIAL HISTORY 215, 218 (May 1978).
15. THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF SOUTH CAROLINA: JOURNAL OF THE COMMONS HOUSE OF
ASSEMBLY, 1755–1757, at xii (Terry Lipscomb ed., 1989) [hereinafter COLONIAL RECORDS OF SOUTH
CAROLINA].
16. Message of the Royal Governor James Glen to the Commons House of Assembly (Feb. 21,
1756), reprinted in COLONIAL RECORDS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 15, at 120.
17. Id.
18. COLONIAL RECORDS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 15, at xviii–xxi.
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B. Naturalization Clause
A second example of early disputes over immigration policy concerns the
meaning of “naturalization.” “Citizenship” was an unsettled notion in the
colonial era and did not operate to demarcate rights as sharply as it does in the
modern period. Under colonial laws, for instance, noncitizens were frequently
eligible to vote.  While colonists usually considered themselves subjects of19
Britain, Britain and its American colonies had distinct bodies of “subjectship”
law. In particular, colonial naturalization policies began to reject concepts of
natural and permanent allegiance in favor of volitional and contractual
principles of citizenship.20
Yet the Declaration of Independence lists British restraints on
naturalization and immigration as a colonial grievance and states that the King
“has endeavoured to prevent the Population of these States; for that purpose
obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; [and] refusing to pass
others to encourage their migration hither. . . .”21
The Articles of Confederation allowed each state to legislate its own
naturalization statutes, resulting in significant variation.  Madison described22
this checkerboard of state rules as “a fault in our system, and as laying a
foundation for intricate and delicate questions. . . .”  By operation of the23
privileges and immunities clause, however, all states were obligated to respect
the rights of the “free inhabitants” of other states.  Resentment soon24
blossomed within restrictionist states opposed to the more generous laws of
other states, especially Pennsylvania, which was alleged to have “receive[d]
all that would come there . . . at the expense of religion and good morals.”25
There was little debate at the Constitutional Convention and during the
ratification period over the desirability of substituting a single national
naturalization rule for the varied state laws. Even Anti-Federalists agreed that
the state naturalization experience was disastrous.  The text of the26
19. Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional, and Theoretical
Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1399 (1993).
20. JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608–1870, at 9 (1978).
21. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 9 (U.S. 1776).
22. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV.
23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 269 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
24. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV.
25. Agrippa, Letter to the Mass. Gazette (Dec. 28, 1787), reprinted in ESSAYS ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 79 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892).
26. Michael T. Hertz, Limits to the Naturalization Power, 64 GEO. L.J. 1007, 1009–13 (1976); Iris
Bennett, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Immigration Consequences of “Aggravated Felony”
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Constitution reflected this consensus as it empowers Congress to “establish
an uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . throughout the United States.”  This27
consensus was also reflected in early Supreme Court decisions, such as Chief
Justice Marshall’s declaration in 1817, “[t]hat the power of naturalization is
exclusively in congress does not seem to be, and certainly ought not to be,
controverted.”  In other words, the Framers deliberately drafted the28
Constitution to grant the naturalization power to the federal government based
on the widespread view that disuniform state regulation in this area under the
Articles of Confederation had failed.
Disuniform local responses to the perceived burdens of new immigrants;
frustration with the immigration policies of a national sovereign; fear and
animus directed towards immigrant families in some communities; local
impulses to welcome new immigrants in other communities; all of these
phenomena would have been familiar to the founding generation and are
visible in the colonial responses to Acadian refugees in the late 1750s and
divergent state naturalization policies under the Articles of Confederation.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN IMMIGRATION REGIME
Congress launched the beginnings of our modern immigration regime in
the post-Civil War period. The Reconstruction Congresses expressed concern
for the mistreatment of immigrants in their debates on the “involuntary
servitude” clause of the Thirteenth Amendment,  the Anti-Peonage Act of29
1867,  the Civil Rights Act of 1870,  and the Padrone Act of 1874.  This30 31 32
concern was particularly expressed with regard to Chinese immigrants in the
western United States, Mexican immigrants in the southwest, and even Italian
Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1696, 170 (1999).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
28. Chirac v. Chirac’s Lessee, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 269 (1817).
29. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897) (“the addition of the words ‘involuntary
servitude’ were said . . . to have been intended to cover the system of Mexican peonage and the Chinese
coolie trade, the practical operation of which might have been a revival of the institution of slavery under
a different and less offensive name”).
30. See Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 673 (D. Ala. 1903) (noting that Congress intended the Anti-
Peonage Act of 1867 to target Mexican peonage system as it existed in New Mexico).
31. See Duane v. GEICO, 37 F.3d 1036, 1041–42 (4th Cir. 1994) (discussing legislative history of
Act of 1870 as response in part to anti-Chinese violence in California), cert. granted, Gov’t Employees Ins.
Co. v. Duane, 513 U.S. 1189 (1995), and cert. dismissed, 515 U.S. 1101 (1995).
32. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 947 (1988) (noting that Padrone Act was enacted to
“prevent [the] practice of enslaving, buying, selling, or using Italian children”).
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immigrant children in the eastern cities.  Soon thereafter, however, Congress33
began to enact laws directing the exclusion at ports of entry of certain
undesirable persons, and later, the deportation or removal from within the
country of others.
Many of these early grounds for federal exclusion or deportation reflected
the same concerns with poverty, disease, and criminality as prior state laws.
Other federal laws became explicitly racial, initially targeting Chinese,
Japanese, and other Asian nationals. Eventually, these laws established
national origins quotas and discriminated against Mexican and other Latino
nationals as well.
As Congress moved to legislate national immigration laws in the late
nineteenth century, legal challenges to the residual state measures, as well as
to various procedural and substantive features of the new federal laws, arose.
The U.S. Supreme Court soon discerned an unenumerated federal power to
regulate immigration, held that the power was exclusively federal, and
invalidated state laws on this basis. In Chy Lung v. Freeman,  for example,34
the Court considered a California statute that permitted state officials to
examine new immigrants arriving at its ports and, if the inspector determined
that an immigrant was within any one of numerous categories of undesirable
persons, to require immigrants to post a significant bond. In 1875, the
Supreme Court struck down the California statute, explaining: “[t]he passage
of laws which concern the admission of citizens and subjects of foreign
nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to the States.”  Similar35
language appears throughout dozens of judicial opinions in the ensuing
century.  With the expansion of the federal immigration apparatus in the late36
33. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1872) (“Undoubtedly while negro
slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any other
kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop
slavery of the Mexican or Chinese race within our territory, this amendment may safely be trusted to make
it void.”).
34. 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
35. Id. at 280 (emphasis added).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 864 (1982) (“The power to regulate
immigration—an attribute of sovereignty essential to the preservation of any nation—has been entrusted
by the Constitution to the political branches of the Federal Government.”); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10
(1982) (“Our cases have long recognized the preeminent role of the Federal Government with respect to the
regulation of aliens within our borders.”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982) (“The States enjoy no
power with respect to the classification of aliens. This power is ‘committed to the political branches of the
Federal Government.’” (citations omitted)); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 n.8 (1977) (“Congress, as
an aspect of its broad power over immigration and naturalization, enjoys rights to distinguish among aliens
that are not shared by the States.”); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976) (“[T]he
authority to control immigration is . . . vested solely in the Federal Government, rather than the
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, backed by Supreme Court decisions
such as Chy Lung v. Freeman, the role of individual states in developing or
implementing immigration policy rapidly diminished.
The full history of federal immigration law, from its late nineteenth
century origins to the modern twenty-first century conflicts, is beyond the
scope of this talk. Today’s immigration regime is codified primarily in the
Immigration and Nationality Act, adopted by Congress in 1952 and frequently
amended since, especially in 1965, 1986, and 1996. In the course of crafting
the statute, Congress has reflected the post-Civil War understanding that
immigration regulation is an exclusively federal function and has occasionally
legislated narrow and explicit derogations from the otherwise muscular
preemption of state or local laws. None of these exceptions, however,
authorize the sort of laws and practices that have cropped up in places like
Arizona and Hazleton.
For example, Congress has expressly authorized direct enforcement of
two criminal immigration provisions. Section 274 of the INA prohibits the
smuggling, transporting, or harboring of illegal immigrants. Subsection (c) of
that provision, entitled “Authority to Arrest,” permits INS agents “and all
other officers whose duty it is to enforce criminal laws” to arrest individuals
who violate Section 274.  In other words, Congress expressly authorized all37
those empowered to enforce criminal laws—including state and local
police—to make arrests for smuggling, transporting, and harboring offenses.
Section 274’s legislative history confirms its plain meaning. As initially
drafted, the provision allowed officers “of the United States” to arrest alleged
smugglers. When Congress removed the restrictive phrase “of the United
States,” it intended to expand enforcement authority by allowing all criminal
law enforcement officers—federal, state, or local—to make arrests for INA
§ 274 violations.  It makes sense specifically to authorize local police to38
States. . . .”); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 416 (1948) (“The authority to control
immigration—to admit or exclude aliens—is vested solely in the Federal Government.”); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941) (“[T]he power to restrict, limit, regulate, and register aliens as a distinct
group is not an equal and continually existing concurrent power of state and nation, but that whatever power
a state may have is subordinate to supreme national law.”). But see DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358
(1976) (“[A]n independent review [of the INA] does not reveal . . . that Congress intended to preclude even
harmonious state regulation touching on aliens in general, or the employment of illegal aliens in
particular.”).
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2006).
38. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 82-1505, at 1361 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1360, 1361
(noting conference agreement to a House amendment striking out “of the United States” so that “other
officers whose duty it is to enforce criminal laws, would have authority to make an arrest for a violation of
a provision of the act”); Robert S. Chapman & Robert F. Kane, Illegal Aliens and Enforcement: Present
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enforce INA § 274 only in a world in which police are otherwise prohibited
from such enforcement. And, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly reminded
litigants, Congress does not intend any of its statutes to be superfluous, and
thus each provision must be read to have new and definite meaning.
In 1996, Congress passed an amendment to empower state and local
police to arrest a second set of immigration violators: individuals who have
committed the criminal offense of illegal reentry following a prior deportation
based on a felony conviction. The 1996 amendment specifically provides that
“state and local law enforcement officials are authorized to arrest and detain
an individual who (1) is an alien illegally present in the United States and (2)
has previously been convicted of a felony” and ordered deported.39
When Representative John Doolittle initially offered the floor amendment
that became the above described provision, he explained that “the Federal
Government has tied the hands of our State and local law enforcement
officials”  because “current Federal law prohibits State and local law40
enforcement officials from arresting and detaining criminal aliens whom they
encounter[] through their routine duties.”  His amendment, he contended,41
would “untie the hands of those we ask to protect us,”  for the purpose of42
arresting deported felons who illegally reenter the country.
Congress has also long understood that local police enforcement of civil
immigration law is broadly preempted unless expressly authorized by
Congress. Section 103(a)(8) of the INA, first enacted in the 1950s, provides
the Attorney General with emergency powers to authorize “any State or local
law enforcement officer” to enforce federal immigration laws if the Attorney
General certifies the existence of “an actual or imminent mass influx of aliens
arriving off the coast of the United States, or near a land border.”43
Furthermore, in 1996, Congress added non-emergency procedures for
state and local jurisdictions to enforce federal immigration laws in INA
§ 287(g). This provision requires training of state or local police, execution of
Practices and Proposed Legislation, 8 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 127, 145–46 (1975) (discussing the legislative
history of INA §§ 274 and 275 and concluding “[s]ince both of these sections deal with illegal entry into
the United States and since both were considered by the same Congress, the legislators apparently intended
[INA § 274] to be enforced by all enforcement officials and [INA § 275] to be enforced only by the INS”).
39. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 439 (codified
as 8 U.S.C. § 1252C(a) (2000)).
40. 142 CONG. REC. H2191 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1996) (remarks of Rep. Doolittle).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(8) (1996), amended by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 372(3), 110 Stat. 3009–646.
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a written agreement, and close oversight by federal immigration authorities.44
As of 2010, over seventy jurisdictions have entered into a “287(g) agreement,”
authorizing state or local police to enforce civil immigration laws.  More45
importantly, these twin procedures—the emergency “mass influx” procedures
and the ordinary “287(g)” process—reflect a legislative determination that
immigration laws may be enforced by state and local police only pursuant to
a detailed congressional scheme, subject to federal training, supervision, and
oversight, and not at the unilateral initiative of local jurisdictions.
In other words, during the second half of the twentieth century, Congress
approved state and local enforcement of specified immigration crimes and
broad civil enforcement, if done pursuant to detailed statutory procedures.
Each of these provisions was enacted on the understanding that only the
federal government can make or enforce immigration laws, and each
represents a narrow, but explicit, departure from that principle.
III. THE CONTEMPORARY PERIOD
While the twentieth century was largely a time of an ascendant federal
immigration regime and diminishing state and local participation, the past
decade looks different.
The federal regime, creaky and out-of-date, has endured nevertheless, and
the Department of Homeland Security is currently the largest federal law
enforcement agency. It is an agency with skyrocketing budgets and new
records for arrests, detentions, and removals set virtually every year—higher
in the first year of the Obama Administration than in any year of the Bush II
Administration.46
At the same time, however, there has been an undeniable explosion of
immigration-related policymaking at the state and local level. Punitive
measures, such as those adopted in Hazleton, Pennsylvania and in Arizona,
have received much of the media attention. Some local integrationist
strategies, such as municipal confidentiality or non-cooperation orders
regarding immigration enforcement or New Haven’s own Elm City Resident
44. INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). Congress established these procedures in 1996 upon
enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act.
45. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/
287g.htm#signed-moae (last visited Nov. 21, 2010).
46. Secretary Napolitano announces record-breaking immigration enforcement statistics achieved
under the Obama administration, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Oct. 6, 2010), http://
www.ice.gov/news/releases/1010/101006washingtondc2.htm (“In fiscal year 2010, ICE set a record for
overall removals of illegal aliens, with more than 392,000 removals nationwide.”).
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Card (an optional municipal identification card), have provoked local
controversy.  Still other inclusionary approaches, many modest or47
incremental, such as a town hall offering some of its materials in languages
other than English, have become common, but do not always attract the same
public scrutiny. What explains the growth of state and local measures and the
wildly divergent approaches adopted by communities across the country? And
given the longstanding history of federal supremacy in immigration policy and
enforcement, are they likely to survive and flourish? I think four primary
factors explain the current turmoil.
First is a general trend toward devolution, visible across government
programs affecting immigrants and predating the most recent events. For
instance, in 1996, Congress enacted a major overhaul of welfare programs.48
When Congress could not resolve a disagreement about immigrant eligibility
for the major cooperative federal-state programs, such as Medicaid and
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (the successor to AFDC), it largely
punted to the states, authorizing each to determine for itself whether large
classes of foreign nationals would be eligible for Medicaid and TANF, subject
to federal limitations.49
Thus, in the late 1990s, when all state legislatures had to rewrite their
own welfare laws in response to vast federal changes, they also were forced
to legislate in historic detail regarding a long list of particular immigration
statuses, mapping those onto state, local, and cooperative federal-state
programs.  Similarly, state criminal justice systems have been increasingly50
forced to confront the consequences of immigration status at arraignments,
plea hearings, sentencing, and during probation.  This trend dramatically51
47. Jennifer Medina, New Haven Approves Program to Issue Illegal Immigrant IDs, N.Y. TIMES,
June 5, 2007, at B6. See also Wyatt Buchanan, S.F. Supervisors Approve ID Card for Residents, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 14, 2007, at B1; Jocelyn Wiener, Coalition Seeks Oakland ID Card, EAST BAY EXPRESS,
Sept. 17, 2008.
48. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Welfare Act or
PRA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of 8 and 42 U.S.C.).
49. Title IV of the Welfare Act is entitled “Restricting Welfare and Public Benefits for Aliens.” Id.
§§ 400–451, 110 Stat. at 2260–77. See Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the
Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101 (2000) (analyzing
constitutionality of federally-authorized, state-imposed alienage restrictions on welfare benefits).
50. Wishnie, supra note 49, at 121 (“The PRA’s sweeping changes to public benefits programs
compelled nearly every state legislature to rewrite vast swaths of state law.”).
51. See, e.g., Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to
Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289 (2008);
Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 97 (1998); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56
AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006).
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intensified in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Padilla
v. Kentucky, holding that a criminal defense lawyer’s failure to advise her
client of the immigration consequences of a plea may constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel.  This ruling is not only likely to result in numerous52
vacated convictions of non-citizens, but also will likely lead to reforms in all
fifty states regarding the role of judges in state criminal courts when accepting
plea agreements, by which the overwhelming majority of criminal
prosecutions are resolved. Finally, but to a lesser degree, following a 2002
Supreme Court decision called Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB,
concerning the rights of undocumented workers under federal labor laws,53
many state labor and worker compensation agencies were forced to engage,
more deeply than previously required, the intersection of labor and
employment law with immigration status.54
Second is demography. While not reaching historic peaks as a percentage
of the population, legal and unauthorized migration in the last twenty years
has been high. More importantly, in the 1990s, new immigrants moved beyond
the traditional “receiving” states, such as California, Texas, Florida, and New
York, to other states and, within all states, beyond the largest cities to
suburban and rural communities, many of which had not experienced
significant new immigration in nearly a century.  The arrival of new, largely55
Spanish-speaking Latino immigrants caused local frictions in communities
where, at least initially, mediating religious, business, and other civic
institutions often did not yet exist. At worst, members of some such
communities reacted with racism and nativism. At a minimum, the reality of
new immigrant populations in such towns compelled public institutions, such
as police departments, public schools, hospitals, and libraries, to adapt their
practices to address the reality of these new residents. And it is these sort of
local adaptations, from Hazleton’s effort to penalize landlords who rent to
immigrant tenants, to the Houston Police Department’s non-cooperation
52. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
53. 535 U.S. 137 (2002), remanded, No. 98-1570, 2002 WL 1974040 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 27, 2002).
54. See Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 467, 512–16 (2004).
55. Michael J. Wishnie, Welfare Reform after a Decade: Integration, Exclusion, and Immigration
Federalism, in IMMIGRANTS AND WELFARE: THE IMPACT OF WELFARE REFORM ON AMERICA’S
NEWCOMERS 69, 76 (Michael Fix ed., 2009); see also Migration Policy Institute, 2009 American
Community Survey and Census Data on the Foreign Born by State, available at http://www.migration
information.org/datahub/acscensus.cfm#rankings.
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policy  and New Haven’s municipal ID, that have often sparked local56
controversies, protests, and lawsuits.
Third is September 11. Following the terrorist attacks, the U.S.
Department of Justice rescinded a prior Office of Legal Counsel memo,
concluding that local police lacked authority to engage in civil immigration
enforcement;  encouraged jurisdictions to execute 287(g) agreements (in the57
five years from its initial enactment in 1996 to 2001, not one local jurisdiction
had executed a 287(g) agreement); commenced entering tens of thousands of
administrative immigration warrants into the FBI’s National Crime
Information Center database, through which local police conduct records
checks on millions of motorists, arrestees, and others they encounter every
day;  and began an aggressive, public campaign to persuade local law58
enforcement officials to make civil immigration enforcement part of their
routine duties, even without a 287(g) agreement.  Without doubt, the prior59
Administration argued that civil immigration enforcement was a national
security imperative and, except for the last one mentioned, each of the above
programs launched to increase state and local participation in immigration
enforcement after September 11 has been continued and intensified by the
current Administration.
Fourth is the absence of meaningful federal reform to our immigration
laws, which remain rooted in a post-WWII model that is out of step with our
current economic and security needs and inconsistent with our moral values.
Polls indicate that a significant majority of the American public supports
immigration reform built on the three pillars of legalization for some but not
all of the current undocumented population; expanded but not unlimited
opportunities for future, lawful immigration, both to reunify families and
through temporary worker programs; and more effective enforcement of the
resulting immigration order.  These three principles were also the foundation60
56. HOUSTON, TX POLICE DEPT. GEN. ORDER NO. 500-5 (June 1992); see also Hartford, CT,
Ordinance Concerning the City of Hartford’s Policy of Providence of City Services as It Relates to
Residents’ Immigration Status (July 2008).
57. Nat’l Council of La Raza v. DOJ, 411 F.3d 350 (2d Cir. 2005) (ordering release of 2002 OLC
memorandum); see also ACLU Refutation of Department of Justice Immigration Memo, available at http://
www.aclu.org/files/assets/ACF3189_2005.pdf (critiquing reasoning of 2002 OLC memorandum).
58. Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J.
CONSTL. L. 1084, 1095–96 (2004).
59. HANNAH GLADSTEIN ET AL., BLURRING THE LINES: A PROFILE OF STATE AND LOCAL POLICE
ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS USING THE NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER DATABASE,
2002–04 (MPI 2005).
60. POLLS SHOW MOST AMERICANS SUPPORT COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM, AMERICA’S
VOICE (2010), http://amvoice.3cdn.net/5cb65e264ef69be85b_nwm6bhjre.pdf (summarizing twenty-nine
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of bipartisan discussions in the U.S. Senate in 2006 and 2007.  In the absence61
of federal legislative action, however, states and localities have had no choice
but to undertake their own diverse efforts to adapt local rules to the
demographic realities of their communities.62
Where will this lead? I expect that many of the most punitive local
measures, like Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and the Hazleton ordinance, will be struck
down by the courts as preempted by federal law. This is certainly the trend of
decisions in the U.S. District Courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals.  By63
contrast, more inclusionary local measures have rarely been challenged in
court, and the few suits initiated have generally failed.  Thus, I expect that64
communities inclined in this direction will continue to pursue integrationist
policies.
More broadly, the state and local debate about appropriate policies
towards new residents that is as old as the Acadian refugee crisis of the 1750s
will surely endure. Yet, this very local friction will likely contribute to the
pressure on Congress to modernize our antiquated immigration statutes in
ways that reflect the center of public opinion: some legalization, some
enhanced “future flows,” and meaningful enforcement of laws capable of
being carried out.
IV. PROPORTIONALITY
It is no secret that the motivation for many of those who promote laws
like S.B. 1070 and of those who resist such oppression is not to achieve a
polls conducted by different polling firms from September 2008 through November 2010, finding majority
support for immigration reform); see also RESEARCH CENTER: PUBLIC OPINION ON IMMIGRATION,
NATIONAL IMMIGRATION FORUM (2010), http://www.immigrationforum.org/research/public-opinion.
61. See, e.g., S. 1348, 110th Cong. (as introduced in Senate May 9, 2007); Immigration Bill Dies
in the Senate, CHI. TRIB., June 29, 2007 (noting bipartisan support for proposal).
62. Wishnie, supra note 55, at 76–79.
63. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 858 (N.D. Tex. 2008)
(granting permanent injunction); Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (S.D. Ca. 2006)
(granting TRO); Reynolds v. City of Valley Park, No. 06-CC-3802, 2007 WL 857320 (Mo. Cir. Ct.
Sept. 27, 2006) (second TRO issued Sept. 27, 2006), vacated as moot, 254 S.W.3d 264 (Mo. App. E.D.
2008); Robert Stewart, Inc. v. Cherokee County, No. 07-CV-0015 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 4, 2007) (granting TRO);
but see Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., No. 4:07CV00881 ERW, 2008 WL 294294 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31,
2008) (dismissing challenge to local employer and landlord sanctions measure).
64. See, e.g., Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007) (dismissing challenge to in-state tuition
law for plaintiffs’ lack of standing without reaching plaintiffs’ argument that state law was preempted by
federal law), rehearing en banc denied, 511 F.3d 1030 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 554 U.S. 918 (2008);
Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010) (rejecting challenge to California in-
state tuition provision).
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more perfect balance in state-federal relations. Rather, it is an underlying,
substantive disagreement about the content of our immigration laws and
policies. Many who resist S.B. 1070 believe that federal immigration laws are
too harsh, and that many people who are subject to arrest, detention, and
removal should not be. After all, if today’s immigration laws are the moral
equivalent of Jim Crow,  then none could argue we should expend scarce65
local dollars for their more efficient implementation. And yet, many who
advocate S.B. 1070, of course, do not believe the current laws are too harsh.
If they did, they would not call for the dedication of state resources to their
enforcement.
Another way to describe this more fundamental disagreement is as one
about proportionality—whether the sanction of removal fits the offense for
which it is meted out. Proportionality is a concept with ancient roots in Anglo-
American law, dating at least to Magna Carta.  Andrew von Hirsch, a leading66
philosopher of proportionality, explained that the principle of proportionality
“embodies, or seems to embody, notions of justice. People have a sense that
punishments scaled to the gravity of offenses are fairer than punishments that
are not. Departures from proportionality—though perhaps eventually
justifiable—at least stand in need of defense.”  And it is not only the67
retributive theorists, who focus on whether an individual receives a “just
desert,” that express this view, but also many utilitarians (tracing all the way
back to Bentham) who argue that a failure to punish proportionally is
inefficient, fails appropriately to deter misconduct, and undermines the rule
of law.68
The principle of proportionality is also reflected in numerous common
law rules and constitutional provisions, from the Eighth Amendment’s
65. See, e.g., Karla Mari McKanders, Sustaining Tiered Personhood: Jim Crow and Anti-Immigrant
Laws, 26 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 163 (2010).
66. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983).
67. Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, 16 CRIME & JUST. 55,
56 (1992); see also STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 160 (2010)
(“proportionality helps reconcile competing rights and interests in a workable way”); Mattias Kumm, The
Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point of Rights-Based Proportionality
Review, 4 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 141, 141 (2010) (“Proportionality-based judicial review
institutionalizes a right to contest the acts of public authorities and demand a public reasons-based
justification.”).
68. See Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263,
272–79 (2005); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 499
(1997) (“because it promotes forces that lead to a law-abiding society, a criminal law based on the
community’s perceptions of just desert is, from a utilitarian perspective, the more effective strategy for
reducing crime”).
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prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment  and excessive fines,  to the69 70
Fifth Amendment’s bar on grossly excessive punitive damages  and its71
command that private property shall not “be taken for public use without just
compensation.”  Notions of proportionality also find expression in72
international law and some foreign legal traditions.73
In the United States, judicial enforcement of the constitutional command
of proportionality tends to operate as a limiting principle, restricting
government action only in the most extreme of cases. Yet the doctrine is
robust across substantive legal disciplines and, more importantly, the principle
may have useful application in the immigration context, especially in the
period between today and the date on which Congress, one day, enacts
humane immigration laws of which we can be proud.74
Broadly speaking, the Supreme Court has developed two forms of
proportionality review. The first it has called “narrow proportionality review”
69. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
See also Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677,
687–99 (2005); Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth
Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 576–90 (2005); Rachel Van
Cleave, “Death is Different,” Is Money Different? Criminal Punishments, Forfeitures, and Punitive
Damages—Shifting Constitutional Paradigms for Assessing Proportionality, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
217, 223–46 (2003).
70. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998); see also Barry Johnson, Purging the Cruel
and Unusual: The Autonomous Excessive Fines Clause and Desert-Based Constitutional Limits on
Forfeiture After United States v. Bajakajian, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 461, 478–86; Van Cleave, supra note
69, at 250–53.
71. BMW of N. Am, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). See also Pamela S. Karlan, “Pricking the
Lines”: The Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880,
903–14 (2004).
72. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 388–91 (1994) (requiring “rough proportionality”
between government conditions for approval of development and impact of proposed development on
public interest); see also City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999)
(noting that “in a general sense concerns for proportionality animate the Takings Clause” but limiting
“rough proportionality” test to exactions requiring dedication of property for public use).
73. Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism,
47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72 (2008); Thomas M. Franck, Proportionality in International Law, 4 LAW
& ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 230 (2010).
74. Writing before the Supreme Court’s decisions in Padilla v. Kentucky and Graham v. Florida,
other scholars have argued that deportation may be a disproportional sanction in some cases, and have
recommended various legislative reforms to address the constitutional problem. Angela Banks,
Proportional Deportation, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1651, 1671–79 (2009) (noting that due process requires
proportionality and proposing creation of rights-based category of relief from removal that would allow
immigration judges to consider factors necessary to ensure proportionality); Juliet Stumpf, Fitting
Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1732–40 (2009) (proposing graduated system of sanctions for
immigration violations). In these remarks, I contend that courts should apply proportionality analysis to
removal cases, under the direct command of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
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and this is essentially a form of case-by-case analysis.  In the criminal75
context, courts use a two-step inquiry to apply this case-by-case
proportionality analysis. First, the court asks whether a particular criminal
sentence is so excessive in relation to the gravity of the offense as to raise an
inference of “gross disproportionality.”  For instance, in Solem v. Helm, the76
Supreme Court concluded that a life sentence for passing a bad check raised
an inference of gross disproportionality,  and last year, Chief Justice John77
Roberts did the same in another non-capital case.  Next, the Court will78
proceed to conduct two comparative assessments: one intra-jurisdictional,
examining other sentences meted out for comparable offenses within the same
jurisdiction and other crimes for which the same sentence is imposed, and the
other inter-jurisdictional, looking at how other jurisdictions punish similar
offenses.  At this step in the inquiry, the court attempts to determine whether79
a particular sentence is significantly out of step with sentences imposed for
comparable misconduct within and without the sentencing jurisdiction.  In a80
rare case, the Court may conclude that a sentence otherwise lawfully imposed
is so disproportionate as to be unconstitutional, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s “cruel and unusual punishment” clause.81
This case-by-case proportionality analysis rarely leads to overturning a
sentence.  But sometimes it does. Chief Justice Roberts concurred in Graham82
v. Florida on this rationale, concluding that a sentence of life without parole
for a juvenile non-homicide offender failed this sort of case-by-case gross
disproportionality test.  Overall, the Supreme Court has decided more than83
a half-dozen non-capital cases on this case-by-case proportionality basis.84
75. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Our
decisions recognize that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause encompasses a narrow proportionality
principle.”). See also John D. Castiglione, Qualitative and Quantitative Proportionality: A Specific
Critique of Retributivism, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 71, 84–86 (2010); Stephen T. Parr, Symmetric Proportionality:
A New Perspective on the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 68 TENN. L. REV. 41, 57–58 (2000).
76. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005–06.
77. Solem, 463 U.S. at 291–303.
78. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2036 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
79. Solem, 463 U.S. at 291.
80. See, e.g., id. at 299–300 (comparing sentences and noting that Helm was treated in “the same
manner as, or more severely than, criminals who have committed far more serious crimes” and “more
severely than he would have been in any other State”).
81. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Solem, 463 U.S. at 303.
82. See e.g., Castiglione, supra note 75, at 84 (“[T]he narrow proportionality regime, which prevails
today, is generally considered to be an empty shell; it prohibits punishments that are ‘grossly
disproportionate,’ but almost never leads to the overturning of a sentence of a term of years.”).
83. 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
84. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (fifteen-year sentence at hard and painful
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The Court’s second approach to considering whether a criminal sentence
is constitutionally “proportional” is not case-by-case, but rather categorical.85
In this line of cases, the judicial inquiry focuses generally on the nature of the
offense or the characteristics of the offender.  Applying the categorical86
approach the Supreme Court has occasionally held that capital punishment is
grossly excessive—unconstitutionally disproportionate—for certain offenses
and for certain offenders.
The judicial test for proportionality in these categorical cases is phrased
differently from that for proportionality on a case-by-case basis, but the
underlying inquiry is not radically dissimilar. Under the categorical approach,
“the Court first considers ‘objective indicia of society’s standards, as
expressed in legislative enactments and state practice’ to determine whether
there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue.”  This87
involves not only counting up and comparing state laws, but also examining
state practices, which often differ from law on the books.  The court will then88
look to “the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and
characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in question.”  The89
court will also ask whether the sentencing practice “serves legitimate
penological goals,”  meaning retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or90
rehabilitation. The court may also consider foreign or international practices.91
And in cases applying the categorical approach to proportionality review,
the doctrine is more robust. Applying its categorical proportionality test in
capital cases, the Supreme Court has held that capital punishment is not
labor in Philippines, and imposition of lifetime disabilities, for violation of public document rule regarding
payment of wages, violates Eighth Amendment); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (life sentence for
seventh conviction for passing bad check violates proportionality). But see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957 (1991) (life sentence for cocaine possession not disproportional); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63
(2003) (same as to California third-strike conviction); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (same);
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (upholding life sentence under Texas recidivist statute for theft
of $120); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (upholding forty-year sentence for possession and intent to
distribute nine grams of marijuana).
85. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2026.
90. Id. See also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2661–62 (2008); Panetti v. Quaterman, 551
U.S. 930, 957–60 (2007); Dan Markel, Executing Retributivism: Panetti and the Future of the Eighth
Amendment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1163, 1179 (2009).
91. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033 (listing Eighth Amendment cases where the Court “looked beyond
our Nation’s borders”). See also Sarah Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1,
70–80 (2006).
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permissible for certain offenses, namely non-homicide crimes against
individuals,  or certain offenders, specifically juvenile offenders  or those92 93
with low intellectual functioning.  The latter cases place significant emphasis94
on the diminished culpability of young persons, who do not bear the same
moral responsibility for their actions as adults, and others with mental health
or developmental impairments.
Importantly, for many years the Supreme Court applied its categorical
analysis only to capital cases and reviewed proportionality challenges to non-
capital sentences only under the case-by-case standards for proportionality.
That changed last year. In Graham v. Florida, Justice Kennedy wrote for the
Court that a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile non-homicide
offender violated the constitutional command of proportionality under the
categorical approach.95
So far, I have discussed only cases arising under the Eighth Amendment’s
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. But the Court has also concluded that
fines are subject to a similar review under the Excessive Fines Clause, in a
case involving a man who failed to disclose the full amount of cash he was
lawfully carrying out of the country and subsequently received a massive fine
for what was essentially a paperwork violation.  There, the Court explained,96
“[t]he amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of
the offense that it is designed to punish.”  The Court went on to apply a97
version of case-by-case proportionality analysis, which the Court termed
“gross disproportionality.”98
Proportionality is also required when it comes to civil sanctions,
including land use exactions and punitive damages. In the land use case Dolan
v. City of Tigard,  the Supreme Court again used a form of case-by-case99
analysis that it called “rough proportionality.” The Court reasoned that “[n]o
precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort
92. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that death sentence for rape is disproportionate);
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding that death sentence for felony murder simpliciter, with
no finding of an intent to kill, is disproportionate).
93. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
94. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313–17 (2002); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
95. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030–33. Chief Justice Roberts concurred in the judgment but would
have ruled only on the narrower, case-by-case proportionality grounds. Id. at 2036.
96. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
97. Id. at 334.
98. Id. at 336. See also Lee, supra note 69, at 728–30; Van Cleave, supra note 69, at 246–53.
99. 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
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of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”100
On the civil side, the notion of proportionality is best developed in
punitive damage cases. There the Court has moved from an initial series of
decisions holding punitive damage awards immune from substantive review101
to concluding that they are subject to a proportionality analysis very similar
to that under the Eighth Amendment.  In BMW v. Gore, the Court established102
three “guideposts”: (1) reprehensibility of the underlying conduct, (2) ratio of
harm to plaintiff and other conceivable victims (compensatory damages), and
(3) comparison to other civil and criminal penalties that could be imposed for
conduct.  In State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell, the Court103
went further, articulating a categorical-type rule that “few awards exceeding
a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a
significant degree, will satisfy due process.”104
BMW v. Gore reads a lot like a case-by-case proportionality review in a
non-capital case, where the court begins by considering the severity of the
sentence in relation to the gravity of the offense and then may move on to
various comparative analyses. And the analysis in State Farm yields a near-
categorical holding for punitive damages not unlike the Court’s categorical
proportionality rulings in Graham and a number of capital cases. Many
scholars have noted that judicial scrutiny of disproportionate civil sanctions,
such as punitive damages, appears to be more searching than review of
criminal sentences.  This too suggests that there is an important role for the105
courts in considering the proportionality of civil immigration sanctions, such
as deportation.
What might all of this mean for immigration law? As a threshold matter,
removal orders should be subject to proportionality review by courts, both on
a case-by-case basis and categorically. This is so under the Eighth
100. Id. See also E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN
AMERICAN LAW 74–80 (2009); K.G. Jan Pillai, Incongruent Disproportionality, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
645, 655–58 (2002).
101. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989); Pac. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
102. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
103. Id. at 574–83.
104. 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
105. See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 71, at 910 (contrasting the “Court’s retreat from proportionality
review in the criminal context” with “its enthusiastic embrace in the punitive damages cases”); Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2004) (noting the “cruel
irony . . . too many years in prison for shoplifting does not violate the Constitution but too much money in
punitive damages against a business for ‘manslaughter’ is unconstitutional”).
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Amendment, at least in cases where a removal order is the result of a criminal
conviction. As the Supreme Court observed last year, “deportation is an
integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that
may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified
crimes.”  This is also so under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause,106
even where deportation is not the result of a criminal conviction, because a
removal order is a punitive sanction that mandates departure  and also bars107
lawful return for a period of years.  Because the Due Process Clause requires108
that a civil penalty be proportionate to the gravity of the offense, and removal
orders are punitive, at least in part, then removal orders are subject to judicial
review on constitutional proportionality grounds even where the individual
has not been convicted criminally.
A. Case-by-Case Proportionality Review in Immigration Cases
How should judicial review for proportionality operate on a case-by-case
basis in removal proceedings? The Supreme Court directs that the case-by-
case proportionality inquiry in criminal cases begin with a comparison
between the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sanction.  Where109
there is an inference of gross disproportionality, the court must then proceed
to various forms of comparative analysis, both intra- and inter-jurisdictional.110
In immigration, one can imagine the analysis frequently ending at the first
step, with courts concluding that deportation and a bar on return for a period
of years or on a permanent basis is not grossly disproportionate to the
underlying immigration offense.
But this will not always be so, just as it is not always the end of the
analysis in proportionality challenges to an award of punitive damages or to
a criminal sentence. A removal order imposes two discrete penalties:
mandatory departure from the United States and a ban on lawful return. The
106. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010).
107. Id. at 1481 (“We have long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe ‘penalty.’”)
(quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893)); Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S.
388, 390–91 (1947) (“Deportation can be the equivalent of banishment or exile.”); Bridges v. Wixon, 326
U.S. 135, 154 (1945) (“Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a great
hardship on the individual . . . . That deportation is a penalty—at times a most serious one—cannot be
doubted.”).
108. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i), (ii)(II) (2006) (person removed may not lawfully return to the
United States for 5, 10, or 20 years, or ever, depending on circumstances).
109. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290–91.
110. Id. at 296–300.
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length on the ban on lawful return depends on various factors, but is imposed
in all cases and will be five years (if the removal case begins upon a foreign
national’s arrival to the United States),  ten years (if the removal case begins111
after one’s initial entry),  twenty years (if the removal order is a second or112
subsequent order),  or a lifetime ban (if the person was convicted of an113
“aggravated felony”).  Moreover, both undocumented immigrants and those114
lawfully present, whether on a visa as permanent residents or otherwise, are
subject to removal. Finally, it may be relevant to the proportionality analysis
that the current immigration statutes authorize discretionary relief from
removal for a small number of persons otherwise subject to removal, for
instance, on the basis of a valid asylum claim  or where one is the victim of115
domestic violence.116
Now, consider a DREAMer,  a young adult who is undocumented and117
arrived in this country with her parents as an infant or child. Or a refugee
fleeing violent persecution who is time-barred from pursuing asylum because
she was unable to file an application within the one-year statute of limitations.
Or a long-term permanent resident who came to this country legally as a small
child and has maintained his status ever since but, as an adolescent, was
convicted of non-violent offense, such as shoplifting or vehicle theft, that is
now classified as an “aggravated felony.”  There may well be cases in which118
a court should conclude that the severity of the sanction, namely removal and
prohibition on lawful return for 10 years (the DREAMer and the asylum
seeker), or removal and prohibition on lawful return ever (the permanent
resident convicted of an aggravated felony), is so excessive in relation to the
offense that an “inference of gross disproportionality” arises.
111. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (2006). This bar on lawful return and those described infra notes
113–15 may be waived by the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) (2006).
112. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(II).
113. Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i).
114. Id. The statutory category “aggravated felony” is extremely expansive and includes a wide range
of misdemeanors and non-violent offenses. See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996
Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1939–40 (2000).
115. 8 U.S.C. § 1158. Asylum is not generally available to, inter alia, those who fail to file their
applications within one year of entry, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), who have previously applied for asylum,
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(C), or who have been convicted of a “particularly serious crime.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii).
116. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)–(vii), (B)(ii)–(iii).
117. See supra note 5, listing articles that describe the situations of students whom the DREAM Act
would help.
118. Morawetz, supra note 114, at 1940.
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If so, then to what, if anything, might one compare the sanction? In the
excessive fine case, Bajakajian, the Court looked to the criminal and civil
penalties apart from the fine.  Here, they may be modest, much more so than119
removal. For the DREAMer and the asylum-seeker, entry without inspection
is a misdemeanor, punishable by a maximum sentence of six months,  a civil120
fine of $50–$250,  and a criminal fine of $5,000,  for instance. The121 122
permanent resident convicted of shoplifting may have received no jail time at
all, only a suspended sentence.123
A court might also look beyond penalties authorized on the face of
statutes to actual sentencing and enforcement practices. The Supreme Court
did precisely that in the life-without-parole case for non-homicide juvenile
offenders when it emphasized that few states pursue such harsh sentences,
even though most states authorize them.  In immigration cases, it may be124
relevant that the United States does not deport many DREAMers, for
instance.  Immigration authorities have also repeatedly declared their intent125
to prioritize the arrest and removal of those who pose a threat to national
security or public safety, as opposed to more low-level offenders.126
119. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 338–39.
120. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a).
121. Id. § 1325(b).
122. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b) (2006).
123. The immigration statute directs that “[a]ny reference to a term of imprisonment” is deemed to
include the sentence of incarceration ordered, “regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution
of that imprisonment or sentence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B) (defining “conviction”).
124. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023 (“Actual sentencing practices are an important part of the Court’s
inquiry into consensus.”).
125. See Stephen Dinan, DHS: Illegal Immigrant Students Not a Target for Deportation, WASH.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2011, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/apr/1/dhs-illegal-
immigrant- students-not-target-deportat/?page=1 (quoting Secretary Napolitano as stating that DREAMers
are “not the priority” and ICE Director John Morton as stating that there are “in fact very, very few
deportations of [DREAMers]”); Susan Carroll, Immigration Cases Being Tossed by the Hundreds: Docket
Review Pulls Curtain Back on Procedure by Homeland Security, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 16. 2010, at A1
(noting that ICE is dismissing cases where respondent has been present in United States for two years or
more and has no serious criminal history).
126. Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to all
employees of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (June 30, 2010), available at http://www
.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/civil_enforcement_priorities.pdf (establishing those who pose a “risk
to national security or danger to public safety” as “priority one,” recent illegal entrants as “priority two,”
and immigration fugitives or those who “otherwise obstruct immigration controls” as “priority three”); see
also Alvarez v. Holder, No. 08-71383 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2011) (ordering supplemental briefing on the effect
of the Morton Memorandum); Dinan, supra note 125 (quoting Secretary Napolitano as saying that
DREAMers are “not a priority” for enforcement). CRISTINA RODRIGUEZ ET AL., A PROGRAM IN FLUX: NEW
PRIORITIES AND IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES FOR 287(G) 12 (Migration Policy Inst. 2010), available
at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-March2010.pdf (analyzing new priorities for 287(g)
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The above remarks examine how a court might conduct a case-by-case
proportionality analysis as to the sanction of removal itself. But there is a
second aspect of all removal orders that should also be subject to
proportionality review, namely the bar on lawful return. This bar varies from
five years to forever, depending on the circumstances of the individual.127
These bars on lawful return may also violate the constitutional command of
case-by-case proportionality, because they raise an inference of gross
disproportionality and work a kind of sentence that, in many cases, will be
radically greater than any actual criminal sentence that was, or could have
been, imposed.128
Finally, a small number of persons ordered removed applied for relief but
were denied it, either because they failed to demonstrate a substantive ground
for relief—such as persecution for asylum  or hardship for cancellation of129
removal —or were denied relief in the discretion of the immigration judge.130
An immigration judge’s refusal to grant discretionary relief for which one has
applied and is eligible may also be subject to proportionality review on a case-
by-case basis. In such cases, a court may undertake a form of intra-
jurisdictional analysis by comparing the disposition of an instant case to
others decided by the courts or the Board of Immigration Appeals, which
hears administrative appeals in removal cases.  And while the immigration131
statutes generally bar review of the denial of discretionary immigration relief
other than asylum,  the U.S. Courts of Appeals retain jurisdiction to review132
constitutional claims.  Therefore, a claim that one’s removal violates133
constitutional proportionality requirements would be subject to judicial
review, even in a case involving the denial of discretionary relief.
agreements that prioritize persons committed of violent crimes as “Level 1”).
127. See supra notes 112–15 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 338–39 (comparing fine to potential criminal penalties for
underlying misconduct); BMW, 517 U.S. at 574–83 (same as to punitive damage award).
129. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) (authorizing grant of asylum to a person determined to be a “refugee”
within the meaning of § 1101(a)(42)(A)); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (Refugee is one who is unable to
return to her country of nationality because of “persecution” or a “well-founded fear of persecution.”).
130. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (establishing that, among other criteria, a nonpermanent resident who
seeks “cancellation of removal” must demonstrate “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a
qualifying relative).
131. See Margot K. Mendelson, Note, Constructing America: Mythmaking in U.S. Immigration
Courts, 119 YALE L.J. 1012 (2010) (examining BIA decisions on application for cancellation of removal
and discerning functional criteria applied by Board to sort meritorious and non-meritorious cases).
132. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B).
133. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (stating that INA does not preclude review of constitutional claims);
see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300 (2001) (stating that barring review of “pure question[s] of law”
in removal cases would raise “substantial constitutional questions”).
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B. Categorical Proportionality Review in Immigration Cases
As for the categorical approach in removal cases, a court applying
existing Eighth Amendment standards for proportionality review would begin
with the “objective indicia” of society’s standards, namely laws and
practices.  As above, it is not generally the practice of immigration134
authorities to remove DREAMers, and ICE leadership has repeatedly
emphasized that it prioritizes for arrest and removal those persons convicted
of serious crimes, who pose a national security or public safety threat, or who
have previously been ordered removed but failed to depart.  There are other135
categories of persons who could be prosecuted in removal proceedings, such
as juveniles and the mentally ill, but generally are not singled out in any ICE
enforcement program for prosecution or arrest on those grounds.  A136
categorical analysis might well focus on such sub-groups of persons subject
to, but not usually targeted for, removal.
The Court will then look to “the culpability of the offenders at issue in
light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the
punishment in question.”  The Court will also ask whether the sentencing137
practice “serves legitimate penological goals,”  namely retribution,138
deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.
Consider that the Supreme Court has emphasized the diminished
culpability of juveniles in Roper  and Graham,  and those with low139 140
134. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022; Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
135. See supra notes 125–26.
136. ICE does arrest and place into removal proceedings substantial numbers of juveniles, mentally
ill persons, and low-level offenders, even though such persons are not within the agency’s enforcement
priorities. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ACLU, DEPORTATION BY DEFAULT: MENTAL DISABILITY,
UNFAIR HEARINGS, AND INDEFINITE DETENTION IN THE US IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 8 (2010), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/usdeportation0710_0.pdf (“While no exact official figures exist, the
percentage of non-citizens in immigration proceedings with a mental disability is estimated to be at least
15 percent of the total immigrant population in detention.”); AARTI SHAHANI & JUSTICE STRATEGIES, NEW
YORK CITY ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION DETAINERS: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 1 ( 2010), available at
http://www.justicestrategies.org/sites/default/files/publications/JusticeStrategies-DrugDeportations-
PrelimFindings.pdf (“While Homeland Security purports to target the most dangerous offenders [at Rikers
Island jail], there appears to be no correlation between offense level and identification for deportation.”).
137. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
138. Id.
139. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (holding that Eighth Amendment prohibits death penalty for juvenile
offenders).
140. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034 (holding that Eighth Amendment prohibits life without parole for
juvenile nonhomicide offenders).
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intellectual functioning in Ford  and Atkins.  In discussing juveniles, for141 142
instance, the Court has explained that “[a]s compared to adults, juveniles have
a ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility’”;  and143
therefore, while a juvenile “is not absolved of responsibility for his actions[,]
. . . his transgression ‘is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.’”144
Is there not an argument that the moral culpability of an infant carried across
the border by his mother or of a severely mentally ill person diminishes the
reprehensibility of their conduct? And, the severity of the sentence imposed
on one who is mentally ill or who has never really lived in a country of birth,
does not speak the language, and has no close family is undeniably acute.
As for the penological goals, removal of DREAMers and others not
targeted for enforcement by ICE will incapacitate, but it cannot deter future
infants, for instance, nor is it likely to deter other juvenile offenders for the
reasons elaborated by the Court in Graham.  Nor is removal of such persons145
likely to lead to rehabilitation for the immigration violation. Nor, finally, is it
clear that removal in such instances will serve retributive purposes, to the
extent retribution is even appropriate for an immigration violation;
philosophers and criminal law scholars agree that achieving retribution in a
victimless offense situation can be particularly difficult.146
There may be other applications of the categorical approach to
proportionality in immigration law. The immigration statutes for more than a
century have contained a kind of statute of limitations, called “registry.” This
provision currently directs that a person who entered the United States before
January 1, 1972, has resided here continuously, and is of good moral character
may obtain LPR status.  The statute effectively creates a statute of147
limitations or, rather, a cut-off date for enforcement of immigration law. But
141. Ford, 477 U.S. at 417–18 (holding that Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of prisoner who
is insane).
142. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that Eighth Amendment prohibits the
execution of mentally retarded criminals).
143. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70).
144. Id. (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)); see also id. (“[D]evelopments
in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult
minds.”).
145. Id. at 2028–29 (discussing retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, and
emphasizing that juveniles are immature and “less likely to take a possible punishment into consideration
when making decisions”); see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 571 (“[J]uveniles will be less susceptible to
deterrence.”).
146. Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, 16 CRIME & JUST. 55,
82 n.7 (1992).
147. 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (2006).
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for most of the past century, Congress periodically revised this statute to
ensure the limitations period was much briefer. The 1972 date was fixed by
Congress in 1986, for instance, replacing the prior date of June 30, 1948.148
The 1948 date, in turn, was inserted in 1965, to replace June 28, 1940  and149
so on back into the 1920s—a consistent tradition of a statute of limitations of
approximately 15–20 years on immigration offenses.  It may be that removal150
of a person who has been present for, say, twenty years and is of good moral
character is grossly disproportionate to the underlying offense.
Similarly, it may be that the expansive definition of “aggravated felony”
in immigration law, which encompasses a long list of crimes from murder to
misdemeanor theft offenses, raises categorical proportionality problems.151
That is because one convicted of an “aggravated felony” is not only subject
to removal, but also barred from immigration relief. Removal as the automatic
consequence of a minor or non-violent crime may be grossly disproportional
to the gravity of the offense, in violation of Eighth and Fifth Amendment
proportionality requirements.
Finally, the bars on lawful return discussed above may also categorically
violate the constitutional requirement of proportionality, not only in the case
of juveniles, the mentally ill, or those convicted only of non-violent criminal
offenses. A permanent bar on the lawful return of one convicted of a minor
crime that is nevertheless classified as an “aggravated felony” by the
immigration statutes may contravene the due process requirement of
proportionality. It may also be, for example, that imposition of the ten year bar
on lawful return for persons ordered removed violates proportionality when
applied to adults who have resided for many years in the United States, even
without status, and who have children, a spouse, or strong community ties
here.
148. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 203(a)–(b), 100 Stat. 3359,
3405 (1986) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (2006)).
149. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 19, 79 Stat. 911, 920 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1259 (2006)).
150. See Richard A. Boswell, Crafting an Amnesty With Traditional Tools: Registration and
Cancellation, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 175, 180–90 (2010).
151. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43); Morawetz, supra note 114.
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C. Potential Objections
One might raise several objections to the claim that an ethic of
proportionality can operate in removal cases and, indeed, that the Constitution
requires judges to undertake this analysis when requested.
I have already hinted at one objection, namely that proportionality is
really a creature of criminal law, and while it may have crept into civil cases
that is a mistake and should not be encouraged.  As a matter of doctrine, this152
objection plainly fails—it is now well-settled that the Due Process Clause,
Takings Clause, and Excessive Fines Clauses require proportionality review
in, respectively, punitive damages,  land use exaction,  and civil153 154
forfeiture  and fine cases.  All of these are civil proceedings. More155 156
fundamentally, this objection fails as a matter of principle as well. The
criminal/civil distinction is often formalistic,  and as Justice Blackmun157
explained for the Court in United States v. Halper, “[t]he notion of
punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts across the division between
the civil and the criminal law.”158
A related but more serious objection may be that only punitive sanctions
trigger proportionality scrutiny, and deportation is remedial, not punitive. To
be sure, the Supreme Court has often stated that deportation is not
punishment  and that it is civil not criminal in nature.  The civil/criminal159 160
distinction is not dispositive for proportionality analysis, as just explained, but
152. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Due Process and Punitive Damages: The Error of Federal
Excessiveness Jurisprudence, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1085, 1089–90 (2006).
153. BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 596–97 (1996); State Farm. Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538
U.S. 408, 426 (2003).
154. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
155. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 606 (1993).
156. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998).
157. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts
about Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1916–20 (2000); Peter L. Markowitz,
Deportation is Different (Aug. 27, 2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file as Cardozo Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 308), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1666788; Robert
Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why At Least Some of the Constitution’s Criminal
Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 323–24 (2000).
158. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447–48 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Hudson
v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997).
159. See, e.g., Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999)
(“[w]hile the consequences of deportation may assuredly be grave, they are not imposed as a punishment”);
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).
160. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (holding that ordinary Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply in deportation proceedings, which are civil, except in cases
of egregious violations).
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the remedial/punitive classification is. In other words, if deportation is wholly
remedial, then proportionality review is not required by the Constitution.161
The Supreme Court’s guidance on classifying a government sanction as
punitive or remedial displays “significant methodological turmoil.”162
Nevertheless, some principles can be divined from two overlapping lines of
precedent in which the Supreme Court has considered cases involving a civil
proceeding challenged as violative of the Double Jeopardy or Excessive Fines
Clause. First, the Court has clarified that the standard for assessing when a
proceeding that is labeled “civil” by a legislature is nevertheless substantively
so punitive that it must be considered “criminal” for Double Jeopardy
purposes.  This standard directs courts to begin with the legislative163
characterization, and to displace the “civil” label for Double Jeopardy
Purposes only on upon significant evidence of the factors outlined in Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez.  This standard is a high one, rarely satisfied in modern164
cases, no doubt because, at least in part, the Supreme Court is reluctant to
forbid outright multiple government sanctions for the same underlying
offense.
In cases arising under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment, by contrast, the Court has looked to history, congressional intent,
and the relationship of the sanction to the underlying misconduct to determine
whether a government sanction is sufficiently punitive to trigger review for
excessiveness.  The standard has been less exacting in practice, as165
161. Banks, supra note 74, at 1656 (“the key question in determining whether or not a sanction is
punishment is not whether it is criminal or civil, but whether it is remedial or punitive”); id. at 1658
(proportionality review appropriate in immigration cases only where there is “initial determination that
deportation is punitive rather than remedial”).
162. Kanstroom, supra note 157, at 1925–26; see also Maureen A. Sweeney, Fact or Fiction: The
Legal Construction of Immigration Removal for Crimes, 27 YALE J. REG. 47 (2010).
163. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1960) (emphasizing deference to legislative classification
of sanction as civil or criminal for Double Jeopardy purposes); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144 (1963) (elaborating six-factor test to determine whether sanction classified by legislature as civil is
sufficiently punitive to be deemed criminal for Double Jeopardy analysis); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S.
435 (1989) (civil False Claims Act following criminal prosecution was criminal punishment in violation
of Double Jeopardy); Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994) (imposition
of state “dangerous drug tax” constituted punishment for Double Jeopardy purposes); United States v.
Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (civil in rem forfeiture not punishment for Double Jeopardy purposes); Hudson
v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) (overruling Halper in part and holding criminal prosecution following
civil monetary penalty and administrative debarment proceeding does not violate Double Jeopardy Clause).
164. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99–100 (court must “first ask” whether legislature applied civil or criminal
label, but will also consider Mendoza-Martinez factors to determine “‘whether the statutory scheme was
so punitive either in purpose or effect’” as to render the sanction a criminal punishment for Double
Jeopardy purposes) (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248–49).
165. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609–19 (1993) (concluding civil forfeiture is punishment
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demonstrated most starkly by the Court’s conclusion that civil forfeiture is
sufficiently punitive to trigger review under the Excessive Fines Clause, but
not punitive enough to constitute criminal punishment for Double Jeopardy
purposes.  This may reflect the Court’s willingness to restrain egregious civil166
sanctions (as reflected in the lower standard for what constitutes punishment
under the Excessive Fines Clause), even when reluctant to prohibit the
sanction outright (as would be required from a conclusion that the same
sanction constituted punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause).
Returning to the objection that deportation is civil and remedial, not
punitive, and thus no proportionality review is required, many scholars have
argued persuasively that deportation proceedings are “quasi-criminal,”
reflecting both criminal and civil elements, and that therefore, more
constitutional criminal procedure norms should apply.  These arguments are167
most compelling as to deportation of permanent residents, in circumstances
that Daniel Kanstroom has described as reflecting “post-entry social
control.”  Maureen Sweeney, for instance, has specifically argued that where168
a conviction results in the automatic deportation of a permanent resident,
“removal functions as punishment for wrongdoing” and thus should not be
“grossly disproportionate to the offense.”  In 2010, the Court appears to have169
accepted these contentions, at least as to permanent residents who are
removable because of a criminal conviction. As Justice Stevens explained in
Padilla v. Kentucky, “deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the
most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen
defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”  It is, the Court170
emphasized, a “particularly severe ‘penalty.’”171
Thus, the objection that removal is not punitive fails, at least as to
permanent residents convicted of crimes, in the face of Padilla and for the
subject to Excessive Fines Clause); United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328 (1998) (same).
166. Compare Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609–19 (1993) (civil forfeiture is punishment
subject to Excessive Fine review); United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328 (1998) (same), with
United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 274 (1996) (civil forfeiture not punishment subject to Double
Jeopardy clause).
167. Kanstroom, supra note 157; Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law:
Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 469 (2007); Pauw, supra
note 157; Markowitz, supra note 157.
168. Kanstroom, supra note 157; see also DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS
IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2007).
169. Sweeney, supra note 162, at 87–88; see also Banks, supra note 74.
170. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010); see also Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U. S. 388, 390–91 (1947)
(deportation is “the equivalent of banishment or exile”).
171. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (quoting Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 740).
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reasons articulated by Kanstroom and others. However, neither the courts nor
scholars have yet deeply engaged the question of whether removal of persons
other than permanent residents is also sufficiently punitive to be subject to
constitutional proportionality review,  and thus, the objection here must be172
met more directly.
The Court has emphasized that if any portion of a sanction is punitive
(even if other parts are remedial), then the government sanction is a penalty.
In other words, a “civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a
remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to
understand the term.”  To the extent that a removal order is punitive, even173
in part, its imposition must satisfy constitutional proportionality requirements.
The aspect of a removal order that seems most obviously punitive is the
imposition of a ban on return of five years or more, depending on an
individual’s circumstances.  The ban on return cannot be easily justified in174
remedial terms, and would appear to accomplish primarily deterrent and
retributive goals.  A full history of such bars is beyond the scope of this175
essay, but should their history indicate a legislative intent to punish or deter,
that will confirm that this aspect of a removal order, even directed at an
unauthorized immigrant, is punitive, thereby triggering proportionality review
of the entire order. Moreover, the removal order itself should be understood
as a penalty, not merely remedial, in many cases; again, consider a DREAMer
brought to this country as an infant.
Second, one might object that the “plenary power doctrine” of
immigration law bars judicial review of substantive immigration law. This is
the doctrine, articulated in the late nineteenth century with roots intertwined
172. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 74, at 1658 (declining to examine whether removal of persons who
have “evad[ed] border controls through surreptitious entry, fraud, or misrepresentation” is subject to
constitutional proportionality requirements because removal in such circumstances is “essentially remedial
in nature”); Sweeney, supra note 162.
173. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989); see also Austin, 509 U.S. 602, 620–22
(1993). Halper was abrogated in part by Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) (overturning Double
Jeopardy holding of Halper), but the Court’s Excessive Fines Clause analysis in Austin was undisturbed.
See also Matthew C. Solomon, The Perils of Minimalism: United States v. Bajakajian in the Wake of the
Supreme Court’s Double Jeopardy Excursion, 87 GEO. L.J. 849 (1999).
174. See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text.
175. A person who illegally reenters the United States to rejoin family members but in violation of
the applicable bar, and who is then criminally prosecuted, see 8 U.S.C. § 1326, may also be able to raise
a traditional proportionality defense in that criminal prosecution, on either a categorical or case-by-case
basis.
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with Plessy v. Ferguson,  that holds that courts simply may not entertain176
challenges to the substantive grounds for deportation, but only to their
procedures.  On the other hand, there is hardly an immigration scholar who177
has not written an article explaining that this doctrine is grossly wrong and has
left immigration a legal backwater, out of step with developments in modern
constitutional law.  But, in addition, a case-by-case proportionality analysis178
is not a facial challenge to grounds of removability, such as would be
precluded by the plenary power doctrine. It is strictly an as-applied challenge.
As for a categorical proportionality claim, that would concededly be a more
direct challenge to the plenary power doctrine but, perhaps, no less invasive
of federal sovereignty than invalidation of capital punishment or life-without-
parole sentences for juveniles is of state sovereignty.
Third, one might object that unlike a criminal offense, or a civil tort for
which punitive damages are allowed, an immigration violation is a continuing
offense. In other words, for a court to prohibit removal on the ground that it
violated a proportionality principle would be to allow continued illegality.179
Yet, where deportation may be imposed as part of the criminal penalty on a
legal immigrant, the continuing offense problem does not necessarily arise.
That is, there is no such “continuing offense” difficulty if a court were to hold
that removal of a legal permanent resident convicted of a particular offense
were to be invalidated as a sanction that is grossly disproportionate to the
underlying criminal offense. Similarly, for a foreign national eligible for but
denied immigration relief, which denial was in violation of constitutional
proportionality requirements, there would be no “continuing offense
problem,” because the constitutional remedy would be to overturn the refusal
to grant the relief. This outcome would in turn confer lawful status and
eliminate any continuing offense concern.
Like other objections, the “continuing offense” objection to
proportionality review is strongest in the context of an undocumented
176. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
177. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (the Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889);
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589–91 (1952).
178. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 863 (1987) (“Chinese Exclusion—its very name is an
embarrassment—must go.”); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration,
Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925 (1995); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last
Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1998)
(arguing that the plenary power doctrine arose from Plessy-era judicial commitment to racial segregation).
179. See I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984) (“The purpose of deportation is not
to punish past transgressions but rather to put an end to a continuing violation of the immigration laws.”).
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immigrant who is not eligible for any relief. But even here, the objection
cannot defeat the constitutional proposition. First, the bar on lawful return of
five or more years for anyone ordered removed may be unconstitutionally
excessive in a particular case. These bars go well beyond mere incapacitation
of the offender; they are enduring sentences. In Graham v. Florida, the
Supreme Court held that a juvenile sentenced to life imprisonment must be
afforded “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”  A juvenile ordered removed may180
be constitutionally entitled to some similar opportunity to demonstrate
“maturity and rehabilitation” so as to be able to lawfully to return to the
United States. The immigration statute does authorize a waiver of the bars on
lawful return,  but the agency regulation implementing this provision states181
that no one may apply for such a waiver until five years after removal, or
twenty years if removed following conviction for an aggravated felony.182
Furthermore, agency guidance appears to direct that such waivers be granted
only very infrequently.  The regulation and the agency guidance may not be183
consistent with constitutional proportionality requirements in individual cases.
Further, the “continuing offense” objection does not overcome the
proportionality requirement as applied to a removal order itself, even an order
entered against an undocumented person who is ineligible for relief. At a
minimum, proportionality may require deferral of execution of a removal
order, for instance until the U.S. citizen children of an undocumented adult
complete high school or otherwise reach the age of majority. In other
circumstances, removal prior to important events in one’s familial, religious,
or professional life may violate proportionality principles. So too might
removal that would divest one of a meaningful opportunity to participate as
a witness or party in pending legal proceedings, or removed to a country
devastated by a recent natural disaster, such as the hurricanes and earthquake
180. 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
181. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii).
182. 8 C.F.R. § 212.2(a) (2010).
183. See, e.g., Matter of Lee, 17 I&N Dec. 275, 277–78 (Comm. 1978) (listing relevant factors in
adjudicating application for readmission as including moral character, recency of deportation, need for
person’s service in the United States, and duration of residency in the United States); Matter of Tin, 14 I&N
Dec. 371, 373 (Comm. 1973); Dragon v. INS, 748 F.2d 1304, 1306 (9th Cir. 1984). Many persons removed
would also confront a second set of bars on lawful return. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i) (2006) (stating
that a person unlawfully present in the United States for six months may not reenter for three years, and one
unlawfully present for one year may not reenter for ten years). There are a number of exceptions. See 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii). There is also a narrow statutory waiver. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v). 
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in Haiti.  More broadly, it may be that the Due Process Clause’s184
proportionality requirement does, in fact, permanently bar the removal of
certain categories of undocumented immigrants ineligible for relief, such as
the DREAMers or those with low mental functioning as discussed above. It
may even permanently bar the removal of certain individuals in extreme
factual situations, pursuant to case-by-case proportionality analysis.
Fourth, one might raise the floodgates problem, noting that the U.S.
Courts of Appeals are already drowning in immigration appeals  to contend185
that they could not possibly conduct a meaningful proportionality review in
the tens of thousands of removal cases reviewed each year. This is a valid
concern, but not a dispositive one, as the Supreme Court itself has often
noted.  The federal courts have not been overcome by proportionality claims186
in either direct criminal appeals or on habeas petitions to review state
convictions, and there is little basis to conclude that adjudicating such claims
in removal cases will be much different. In the vast majority of cases, a case-
by-case proportionality challenge would be swiftly dismissed, as no inference
of “gross disproportionality” would arise. In those few cases where the court
might conclude that a removal order would violate constitutional
proportionality principles, the additional analysis need not be burdensome.
Finally, one might object that there are fewer available metrics for making
the comparative assessments that are common to capital, non-capital, and civil
proportionality analyses. While the metrics may differ in some respects from
those used in other proportionality contexts, they are not wholly absent in the
immigration context, and further scholarship and judicial opinions may help
to develop the metrics, as has occurred in the punitive damages and criminal
law contexts. For instance, the sort of intra-jurisdictional comparison called
for by Solem, Harmelin v. Michigan, and other decisions in the case-by-case
184. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 241.6(a) (2010) (ICE officials may grant stay of removal “in consideration
of factors listed in 8 C.F.R. 212.5”); id. § 212.5(b)(4) (2010) (listing persons “who will be witnesses in
proceedings being, or to be, conducted by judicial, administrative, or legislative bodies in the United
States”); former INS Operations Instruction 287.3a, redesignated as § 33.14(h) of the INS Special Agent’s
Field Manual (Apr. 2000) (directing that “arrangements for aliens to be held or to be interviewed” by state
or federal labor inspectors or attorneys, prior to removal, “will be determined on a case-by-case basis”); 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(S) (2006) (establishing “S” visa category for certain cooperating witnesses necessary
to a criminal investigation or prosecution); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2006) (establishing “U” visa
category for victims of listed crimes).
185. See, e.g., John R.B. Palmer, The Nature and Causes of the Immigration Surge in the Federal
Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 13 (2006–07).
186. See, e.g., Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 (rejecting “floodgates” concern and emphasizing that lower
federal courts are capable of applying legal frameworks “to separate specious claims from those with
substantial merit”).
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lines may be possible in some removal cases,  particularly where an187
applicant has been denied relief on factual circumstances that, in other cases,
have resulted in a grant of relief.  Similarly, as in the punitive damages and188
excessive fine cases, there may be a useful comparison between the lifetime
consequences of deportation and the modest civil or criminal penalties
authorized for some of the underlying offenses.189
In sum, respondents in removal proceedings might argue that their
removal would violate the principles of proportionality inherent in the Due
Process Clause, which indisputably governs removal proceedings, and the
Eighth Amendment, which after Padilla may as well, at least where removal
is the result of a criminal conviction. Proportionality claims might arise where
the immigration courts have denied an application for relief from one eligible
to request it, or even where no relief is authorized. Courts will honor these
principles, and Supreme Court precedent, by adjudicating both case-by-case
and categorical proportionality challenges. In appropriate cases, courts should
find that removal is so grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense
as to be forbidden by the Constitution.
I am not suggesting that more vigorous judicial oversight of the
proportionality of removal orders as a constitutional command would end the
debate on the streets of Arizona, Hazleton, New Haven, and elsewhere. But
courts could and should smooth out the coarser expressions of that debate, as
the Constitution requires. In a sense, this may be what the S.B. 1070 and
Hazleton decisions also represent, a judicial policing of the boundaries of
government punishment that invalidates the harshest, most disproportionate
outcomes, while reserving to the Congress a broad space for policy
disagreement and the ultimate determination of our nation’s immigration
policies.
* * * *
Years from now, I expect it will be difficult to explain to our children and
grandchildren why for decades this nation countenanced the de jure
subjugation of millions of immigrants, benefiting from their labor while
forcing them to live a life in the shadows as members of a reviled caste denied
their full human flourishing. The struggle for balance in immigration policy
will continue to play out primarily in legislatures, and ultimately in Congress
as is appropriate. Yet there remains a vital role for courts in testing local
187. Solem, 463 U.S. at 291.
188. Mendelson, supra note 131.
189. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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measures, no less than federal removal orders, against the constitutional
commands of preemption, equal protection, due process, and, I hope,
proportionality. And in that context, even in the centuries-long debate about
the content of our immigration laws and the role of state and local
governments in carrying them out, the conflicts of the Summer of ’10 may
well turn out to look a lot like those of the Summer of ’57.
